STATE OF HAWAII

CHARGARS UT A

In the Matter of	DR 93-009
Petitioners,	HEARINGS EXAMINER'S FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER; EXHIBITS A-C
LINDA C. TSEU, as Executive) Director of the Hawaii Civil) Rights Commission; JANE DOE,) Complainant,	
Respondents.)	

HEARINGS EXAMINER'S FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

On March 12, 1992 Complainant Jane Doe filed a complaint with this Commission alleging that Petitioners created an offensive work environment and terminated her because of her husband's arrest and court record. She claims that such actions constitute unlawful discrimination based on her marital status and her association with a person who has an arrest and court record.

On September 16, 1993 Petitioners filed a Petition For Declaratory Relief contending that H.R.S. § 378 does not protect individuals who associate with members of a protected class, particularly individuals who associate with persons who have arrest and court records. Accordingly, Petitioners ask the Commission to dismiss this claim.

On October 15, 1993 the Executive Director filed a Memorandum In Opposition To Petition For Declaratory Ruling arguing that discrimination because of association with any protected class, including association with a person who has an arrest and court record, is prohibited under H.R.S. Chapters 368 and 378.

Oral arguments on the petition were held on December 6, 1993.

The parties filed supplemental memoranda on December 20, 1993.

Having reviewed and considered the petition, memoranda filed and the arguments presented, this Hearings Examiner hereby renders the following findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommended order.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

For the limited purposes of this petition, the relevant findings of fact are as follows:

- 1. Complainant was employed by Petitioners as a school business manager. She does not have an arrest or court record.
- 2. Complainant's husband was also employed by Petitioners. During the course of their employment, Complainant's husband was arrested and subsequently pleaded guilty to a criminal charge.
- 3. Some time after her husband's arrest and guilty plea, Complainant was terminated by Petitioners.
- 4. On March 12, 1992 Complainant filed a complaint with this Commission alleging that Petitioners created an offensive work environment and terminated her because of her marriage to and association with a person who has an arrest and court record. The

investigation of this case is pending and no determination of reasonable cause has been made.

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

H.R.S. § 378-2(1)(A) (L. 1991) states:

It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:

- (1) Because of race, sex, sexual orientation, age, religion, color, ancestry, disability, marital status, or arrest and court record:
- (A) For any employer to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or discharge from employment, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual in compensation or in the terms, conditions or privileges of employment...

Petitioners argue § 378-2 only protects individuals who suffer discrimination because of those individuals' own race, sex, sexual orientation, etc. They contend that unlike the Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988 (FHA)¹ and the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)², which expressly prohibit discrimination against individuals

⁴² U.S.C. \$\$ 3604(f)(1)(C), (f)(2)(C) state:

^{. . .} it shall be unlawful-

⁽f)(1) To discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of-

⁽C) any person associated with that buyer or renter. (f)(2) To discriminate against any person in the terms, condition, privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap of-

⁽C) any person associated with that person.

⁴² U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) states in relevant part:
. . the term "discriminate" includes

⁽⁴⁾ excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is know to have a relationship or association . . .

who associate with persons with disabilities, H.R.S. § 378-2 does not contain specific provisions which protect individuals who associate with members of a protected class.

The Executive Director argues that the plain language of H.R.S. § 378-2 can be read to include individuals who associate with members of any protected class. She contends that unlike Title VII,⁴ the section makes no reference to "such individual's" own race, sex, sexual orientation, etc., and therefore includes discrimination based on an associate's protected status.

A court or an agency's duty in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intention and to implement that intention to the fullest degree. State v. Briones, 71 Haw. 86, 92 (1989); State v. Tupuola, 68 Haw. 276 (1985). Such intention is primarily obtained from the language of the statute itself. Briones, supra; State v. Eline, 70 Haw. 597 (1989). However, when the language of a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, legislative history may be considered. Kam v. Noh, 70 Haw. 321, 325 (1989)

See also, H.R.S. § 515-16(6), infra, which contains specific language that prohibits discrimination in housing against persons who associate with members of a protected class.

⁴² U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a)(1) states:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin. (Emphasis added.)

Based on the language and legislative history of H.R.S.

§ 378-2, as well as federal caselaw, I conclude that § 378-2 confers standing only to those individuals who fall within one of the enumerated protected classes. This can include individuals who associate with persons of a different race, sex, sexual orientation, age, religion, color, ancestry or marital status. However, it does not include individuals who associate with persons who have an arrest or court record.

A. Language and Legislative History of § 378-2

The original language and legislative history of § 378-2 show that the legislature intended to limit protection to persons who fall within one of the enumerated protected bases.

Chapter 378 was enacted in 1963. The original § 378-2 states in relevant part:

It shall be unlawful employment practice or unlawful discrimination:

- (a) For an employer to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or discharge from employment, any individual because of his race, sex, age, religion, color or ancestry, provided that an employer may refuse to hire an individual for good cause relating to the ability of the individual to perform the work in question;
- (b) For an employer to discriminate against any individual in compensation or in the terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of race, sex, age, religion, color or ancestry . . .

Act 180, L. 1963 (emphasis added). By specifically referring to an individual's ("his") race, sex, age, religion, color or ancestry, the legislature intended to protect only those persons who fell within one of the listed classes. This intent is confirmed in

Senate Standing Committee Report No. 399, which states, "[t]he purpose of this bill is to make it unlawful for an employer to refuse to employ, to pay less wages than other employees, to discharge an employee because of, or to otherwise discriminate against a person by reason of his race, color, sex, national origin..." 1963 Senate Journal at 810.

In 1973, § 378-2 was amended to include arrest and court record as a protected basis. Again, the statute limited standing only to those individuals who had an arrest or court record. It stated:

It shall be unlawful employment practice or unlawful discrimination:

(1) For an employer to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or discharge from employment, any individual because of his race, sex, age, religion, color, ancestry, or arrest and court record which does not have a substantial relationship to the functions and responsibilities of the prospective or continued employment, provided that an employer may refuse to hire an individual for good cause relating to the ability of the individual to perform the work in question;

(2) For the employer to discriminate against any individual in compensation or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of race, sex, age, religion, color, ancestry, or arrest and court record

Act 54, L. 1973 (emphasis added). Again, this intent was confirmed in the accompanying House Standing Committee Report No. 376 which states, "[y]our Committee agrees that discrimination in employment because a person has been arrested or involved in court proceedings should not be permitted . . . " 1973 House Journal at 912 (emphasis added).

In 1981 § 378-2 was amended to delete the word "his" to read:

It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:

(1) For an employer to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or discharge from employment, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual in compensation or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of race, sex, age, religion, color, ancestry, physical handicap, marital status, or arrest and court record . . .

Act 94, L. 1981. However, the purpose of this amendment was not to expand § 378-2 to include individuals who associate with members of a protected class, but to combine what was formerly subsections (1) and (2). See, testimonies of Joshua C. Agsalud, Director, Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, on H.B. 741 dated February 26, 1981 and March 24, 1981 (certified copies attached hereto as Exhibit A). Nowhere in the legislative history or in the testimonies presented is there any mention of conferring standing to persons who associate with members of all protected classes. See also, House Standing Committee Report No. 549, 1981 House Journal at 1166; Senate Standing Committee Report No. 653, 1981 Senate Journal at 1195; Senate Standing Committee Report No. 1109, 1981 Senate Journal at 1363.

In contrast, the legislature amended H.R.S. Chapter 515 in 1992 to specifically extend standing to persons who associate with members of all protected classes. § 515-16(6) states in relevant

In 1991, § 378-2 was amended to its present form. However, the purpose of such amendment was to add sexual orientation as a protected basis, and to make nonsubstantive technical changes for clarity and style. See, Act 2, L. 1991; Senate Standing Committee Report No. 506, 1991 Senate Journal at 956.

part:

It is a discriminatory practice for a person . . . (6) To threaten, intimidate or interfere with persons in their enjoyment of a housing accommodation because of the race, sex, color, religion, marital status, familial status, ancestry, disability, age or HIV infection of . . . associates of such person.

This section was added to conform state law to the Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988. See, Act 171, L. 1992; Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 49, 1992 Senate Journal at 752. The Federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 was enacted, in part, to expand protection to individuals who associate with persons with disabilities. See, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(1)(C), (f)(2)(C) cited in note 1, supra; U.S. House Report (Judiciary Committee) No. 100-711 at 24, 100th Cong. 2nd Sess. 5 USCAAN 2184 (1988).

In 1992, a bill was introduced to similarly expand § 378-2 to include persons who associate with all protected classes. See, House Bill No. 2810 (L. 1992) (certified copy attached hereto as Exhibit B). This Commission itself apparently recognized that without such an amendment, all associational rights might not be protected. See, testimony of Amefil Agbayani, Chairperson, Hawaii Civil Rights Commission on H.B. 2810 dated February 18, 1992 (certified copy attached hereto as Exhibit C). House Bill No. 2810 was not passed.

Therefore, the legislature has yet to extend standing under Chapter 378 to include individuals who associate with members of all protected classes.

B. <u>Title VII Analysis</u>

The above reading of H.R.S. § 378-2 does not mean that all individuals who associate with members of a protected class lack protection from discrimination. Title VII does not contain language which specifically prohibits discrimination based on Yet, federal courts have granted standing to association. plaintiffs who associate with persons of a different race, sex and national origin on the basis of those plaintiffs' own race, sex and national origin because these protected characteristics were also reasons for the adverse actions taken. For instance, in Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Co., the Eleventh Circuit held that a white man who was not hired by an insurance company because his wife was black had standing to sue under Title VII. 791 F.2d 888, 41 EPD 36,531 at 44,378 (11th Cir. 1986). The court reasoned that

Title VII prohibits racially discriminatory employment practices. The statute has been held to prohibit discrimination against white as well as black persons. (citations omitted)

Where a plaintiff claims discrimination based upon an interracial marriage or association, he alleges, by definition, that he has been discriminated against because of his race.

41 EPD 36,532 at 44,380.

In <u>Reiter v. Center Consolidated School Dist. No. 26-JT</u>, a woman whose employment contract was not renewed because she associated with the Hispanic community had standing to sue on the basis of <u>her own race and national origin</u>. 618 F. Supp. 1458, 1460 (C. Col. 1985). The court concluded that because plaintiff's race

and national origin were different from those of the community she associated with, they were factors affecting the conduct of the defendant. Id.

In <u>Nicol v. Imagematrix Inc.</u>, a man who was terminated because his co-worker wife had become pregnant had standing to sue on the basis of <u>his own sex</u>. 773 F. Supp. 802, 57 EPD 41,067 at 68,724 (D. Vir. 1991). The court, in also discussing the <u>Parr</u> case states:

. . . In other words, a white employee who is discharged because his spouse is black is discriminated against on the basis of his race, even though the root animus for the discrimination an anti-black prejudice. Similarly, the root animus here may be an anti-pregnancy prejudice, but the resulting discrimination is against Mr. Nichol's gender, for only males can have pregnant spouses.

Id. However, the court specifically disallowed derivative standing based on Mr. Nichol's wife's pregnancy, stating:

Defendants contend that Mr. Nichol is asserting third party standing on the basis of his wife's pregnancy and that such derivative standing is not contemplated under Title VII. This Court agrees: third party standing is not adequate for a prima facie Title VII claim. But this argument misses the point, for Mr. Nichol is asserting standing on the basis of his own sex. Thus, in recognizing Mr. Nichol's standing, this Court has not opened the door to other derivative suits under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.

Id., at 68,725 (emphasis added).

Similarly, under H.R.S. § 378-2, an individual who is subject to a discriminatory practice because of his or her association with a person of a different race, sex, sexual orientation, age, religion, color, ancestry or marital status has standing to file a complaint based on that individual's own race, sex, sexual orientation, age, religion, color, ancestry or marital status. The

same analysis applies to these bases since they are protected characteristics held by all persons which can affect the conduct of an employer. Thus, a heterosexual complainant who is fired because she associates with homosexuals has standing based on her own sexual orientation; a young job applicant who is not hired because he lives with his elderly parents has standing based on his own age; a Christian who is fired because she associates with Muslims has standing based on her own religion; a married woman who is not promoted because she associates with single males has standing based on her own marital status.

However, the above legal analysis is inapplicable to individuals who associate with persons that have arrest or court records. The protected basis of having an arrest and court record is not a characteristic held by all persons. As defined in § 378-1, it does not include individuals who don't have arrest or court records. The parties agree that § 378-2 prohibits discrimination against persons who have arrest or court records and does not protect individuals with no records. Thus, individuals with no arrest or court records who associate with persons who do, are not

Like race, sex and national origin, the terms "sexual orientation", "age", "religion" and "marital status" encompass characteristics held by all persons. Under § 378-1, the term "sexual orientation" means having a preference for heterosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality; the term "marital status" means the state of being married or single. The term "age" means the period of a person's lifetime and is not restricted to persons over the age of forty. Senate Standing Committee Report No. 573, 1963 Senate Journal at 867; Administrative Rules 12-46-131, 12-46-134. Administrative Rule 12-46-1 defines "religion" to include all aspects of religious observance, practice and belief. This is the same definition used in Title VII, which has been interpreted to include atheism, as well as moral and ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views. See, Young v. Southwestern Savings & Loan Assn. 509 F.2d 140, 9 EPD 9995 (5th Cir. 1975); EEOC Regulations on Religion Discrimination, 29 CFR Part 1605 (1985).

covered by the general prohibitory language of § 378-2. Such individuals must be specifically protected under some other statutory provision. Presently, H.R.S. Chapter 378 does not do this.

IV. RECOMMENDED ORDER

I do sympathize with Complainant Doe and any other individual who may be a victim of discrimination based on their association with a person who has an arrest and court record. I also recognize the important public policy reasons for prohibiting such discrimination under Chapter 378. Unfortunately, the legislature has yet to amend the statute to afford this protection. Furthermore, under the Title VII analysis discussed above, Complainant can neither assert standing based on her own lack of an

Similarly, the protected basis of having a "disability" is not a characteristic held by all persons. \$ 378-1 defines "disability" to mean the state of having a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities, having a record of such an impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment. It does not include people who are not disabled. \$ 378-2 therefore does not protect persons who are not disabled. See, Ortner v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 59 BNA 1361, 59 EPD 41,807 (Sup. Ct. D.C. 1992) (D.C. Human Rights Act does not protect non disabled person who was terminated and replaced by a disabled person).

Thus, non disabled individuals who associate with disabled persons are specifically protected by other statutory provisions. See, 42 U.S.C. \$ 12112 (ADA employment provisions, supra, note 2); 42 U.S.C. \$ 3604 (FHA provisions, supra, note 1); H.R.S. \$ 515-6(6) (housing discrimination, supra); see also, Code of Ala. \$ 24-8-4(6) (housing); Co. RS \$ 24-34-502.2 (housing); Conn. GS \$ 46a-64c(6)(A) (housing); Fla. St. Ann. \$ 760.23(7)(c) (housing); Ind. St. Ann. \$ \$ 22-9-5-7(4) (employment), 22-9.5-5-5(a)(3) (housing); Mont. Code Ann. \$ 49-2-305(4) (housing); Okl. St. Ann. 25 \$ 1452(A)(15) (housing); Tenn. Code Ann. \$ 4-21-601(7) (housing); Code of Va. \$ 36-96.3(8),(9) (housing).

As pointed out in the Executive Director's Supplemental Memorandum, Minnesota has a specific statutory provision in its Human Rights Act which protects individuals who associate with members of <u>all</u> protected classes. <u>See</u>, Minn. St. Ann. § 363.03 subd. 7(2).

arrest and court record, nor assert derivative standing based on her husband having an arrest and court record.

I therefore recommend that the Commission conclude that an individual who associates with a person of a different race, sex, sexual orientation, age, religion, color, ancestry or marital status has standing to assert a claim under H.R.S. § 378-2 on the basis of that individual's own race, sex, sexual orientation, age, religion, color, ancestry or marital status.

I also recommend that the Commission conclude that an individual who associates with a person who has an arrest and court record does not have standing to assert a claim under H.R.S. § 378-2.

I accordingly recommend that the Commission direct the Executive Director to dismiss Complainant's claim based on this theory. The dismissal of this claim, however, does not affect Complainant's standing to assert claims based on her marital status or any other theories.

Dated: Honolulu, Hawaii, January 4, 1994.

HAWAII CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION

LIVIA WANG Hearings Examiner

Copies sent to:

Frederick R. Troncone, Esq. Attorney for Petitioners Anne Randolph, Esq. HCRC Enforcement Attorney



ROBERT P. TAKUSHI COMPTROLLER

LLOYD I, UNEBASAMI

STATE OF HAWAII DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING AND GENERAL SERVICES

ARCHIVES DIVISION

State Archives
Iolani Palace Grounds
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813

I, JOLYN G. TAMURA, Archivist of the State Archives, of the State of Hawaii, do hereby certify that the attached document is a true and exact xerographic copy of Testimony dated February 26, 1981, relating to House Bill No. 741, presented at a joint hearing of the House Committees on Employment Opportunities and Labor; Education and Culture; and Public Employment and Government Operations on February 26, 1981, by Joshua Agsalud, Director, Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, from the records of the Eleventh State Legislature,

on file in the STATE ARCHIVES, at Honolulu, State of Hawaii.

WITNESS my hand and seal this 28th day of December, A.D., 1993, at Honolulu, State of Hawaii.

JOHN OF TAMURA, STATE ARCHIVIST

STATE OF HAWAII DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

February 26, 1981

To:

The Honorable David M. Hagino, Chairman and Members of the House Committee on Employment Opportunities and Labor Relations

The Honorable Anthony P. Takitani, Chairman and Members of the House Committee on Public Employment and Government Operations

From:

Joshua C. Agsalud, Director
Department of Labor and Industrial Relations

Re: H.B. No. 741

The purpose of this bill is to amend Part I of the Employment Practices Law, Chapter 373, HRS, by clarifying and supplementing various sections in order to extend coverage to all employees in the public sector; to assure that women are provided equal treatment in employment when disabled by pregnancy or maternity; and to provide the general public with a statute and procedures that are easier to comprehend and more compatible with the Federal Civil Rights Act and EEOC's national charge processing system.

Some of the revisions include: extending coverage to employees of all the State and county governments, exemption for domestic service in the home of any person; authority for the department to initiate complaints and file class action complaints; delineation of investigational and enforcement authority; and setting of a 3-year statute of limitation on civil action.

The following is a section by section explanation of the proposed changes:

Section 378-1

- Definitions of "department" and "director" are added.
- State and local governments are included in the definition of "employer".
- Domestic service in the home of any person would not be covered by the law.
- 4. Minor change in the definition of "employment agency" to be more compatible with the Commercial Employment Agencies Law.
- 5. A definition of "because of sex" to provide equal treatment to individuals with pregnancy or maternity related disabilities.
- 6. Defined words are alphabetized for easy reference.

Section 378-2

- 1. Old subsections (1) and (2) are combined into one subsection.
- A new subsection spells out discriminatory practices of an employment agency.
- 3. "Arrest and court record" is included as a factor of discrimination in apprenticeship programs.

Section 378-3

 This entire section, presently Section 378-9, is moved up in the law for easier reference.

- 2. All laws, ordinances, and governmental regulations are excepted from coverage of the law.
- 3. This policy on bona fide occupational qualification is further explained by the change.

 This change would make the exception similar to the federal's.

Section 378-4

- Gives the department the authority to make, sign, and file a complaint.
- 2. Gives the Attorney General and the department the authority to file class action complaints and to litigate on a class action basis.

Section 378-5

- Authorizes the parties to settle before a determination is made on the case.
- 2. Establishes the procedure for legal action if department is unable to obtain a satisfactory conciliation agreement and establishes a 3-year statute of limitation for filing any civil action.
- 3. Department may issue notice of right-to-sue which includes a 90-day statute of limitation for civil action.
- 4. Back pay liability cannot accrue from a date more than 2 years prior to filing of the complaint with the department.
- 5. Makes it unlawful for a party to a predetermination settlement or conciliation agreement to violate the terms of the settlement or agreement.

Section 378-6

- States specifically the department's authority in the investigation, including access to premises and records and the right to examine, photograph, and copy material.
- 2. A records' clause is included.

Section 378-7

Provision regarding oaths, interrogations, depositions, and subpoenas.

Section 378-8

Regarding rules and regulations.

Section 378-9

Penalties.

Based on an estimated additional caseload of 50 to 60 cases per year for complaints against State and local agencies, we will need a minimum of two investigators, one clerk-stenographer, and the related operating and equipment expenses. We have estimated the total cost for the minimum staff and expenses at \$60,000. Additional funds may be needed for spaces to accommodate the additional personnel.



ROBERT P. TAKUSHI

LLOYD I. UNEBASAMI

STATE OF HAWAII DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING AND GENERAL SERVICES

ARCHIVES DIVISION

State Archives Iolani Palace Grounds Honolulu, Hawaii 96813

I, JOLYN G. TAMURA, Archivist of the State Archives, of the State of Hawaii, do hereby certify that the attached document is a true and exact xerographic copy of Testimony dated March 24, 1981, relating to House Bill No. 741, presented before the hearing of the Senate Committee on Human Resources on March 24, 1981, by Joshua C. Agsalud, Director, Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, from the records of the Eleventh State Legislature,

on file in the STATE ARCHIVES, at Honolulu, State of Hawaii.

WITNESS my hand and seal this 28th day of December, A.D., 1993, at Honolulu, State of Hawaii.

JOHN G TAMURA, STATE ARCHIVIST

STATE OF HAWAII DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

March 24, 1981

To:

The Honorable Clifford T. Uwaine, Chairman

and Members of the Senate Committee on

Human Resources

From:


Joshua C. Agsalud, Director

Department of Labor and Industrial Relations

Re: H.B. No. 741

The purpose of this bill is to amend Part I of the Employment Practices Law, Chapter 373, HRS, by clarifying and supplementing various sections in order to extend coverage to all employees in the public sector; to assure that women are provided equal treatment in employment when disabled by pregnancy or maternity; and to provide the general public with a statute and procedures that are easier to comprehend and more compatible with the Federal Civil Rights Act and EEOC's national charge processing system.

Some of the revisions include: extending coverage to employees of all the State and county governments, exemption for domestic service in the home of any person; authority for the department to initiate complaints and file class action complaints; delineation of investigational and enforcement authority; and setting of a 3-year statute of limitation on civil action.



The following is a section by section explanation of the proposed changes:

Section 378-1

- Definitions of "department" and "director" are added.
- State and local governments are included in the definition of "employer".
- 3. Domestic service in the home of any person would not be covered by the law.
- 4. Minor change in the definition of "employment agency" to be more compatible with the Commercial Employment Agencies Law.
- 5. A definition of "because of sex" to provide equal treatment to individuals with pregnancy or maternity related disabilities.
- 6. Defined words are alphabetized for easy reference. Section 378-2
 - 1. Old subsections (1) and (2) are combined into one subsection.
 - A new subsection spells out discriminatory practices of an employment agency.
 - 3. "Arrest and court record" is included as a factor of discrimination in apprenticeship programs.

Section 378-3

This entire section, presently Section 378-9, is moved up in the law for easier reference.

- 2. All laws, ordinances, and governmental regulations are excepted from coverage of the law.
 - 3. This policy on bona fide occupational qualification is further explained by the change. This change would make the exception similar to the federal's.

Section 378-4

- Gives the department the authority to make, sign, and file a complaint.
- 2. Gives the Attorney General and the department the authority to file class action complaints and to litigate on a class action basis.

Section 378-5

- 1. Authorizes the parties to settle before a determination is made on the case.
- 2. Establishes the procedure for legal action if department is unable to obtain a satisfactory conciliation agreement and establishes a 3-year statute of limitation for filing any civil action.
- 3. Department may issue notice of right-to-sue which includes a 90-day statute of limitation for civil action.
- 4. Back pay liability cannot accrue from a date more than 2 years prior to filing of the complaint with the department.
- 5. Makes it unlawful for a party to a predetermination settlement or conciliation agreement to violate the terms of the settlement or agreement.

Section 378-6

- States specifically the department's authority in the investigation, including access to premises and records and the right to examine, photograph, and copy material.
- A records' clause is included.

Section 378-7

Provision regarding oaths, interrogations, depositions, and subpoenas.

Section 378-8

Regarding rules and regulations.

Section 378-9

Penalties.

Based on an estimated additional caseload of 50 to 60 cases per year for complaints against State and local agencies, we will need a minimum of two investigators, one clerk-stenographer, and the related operating and equipment expenses. We have estimated the total cost for the minimum staff and expenses at \$60,000. Additional funds may be needed for spaces to accommodate the additional personnel.



ROBERT P. TAKUSHI COMPTROLLER

LLOYD I, UNEBASAMI DEPUTY COMPTROLLER

STATE OF HAWAII DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING AND GENERAL SERVICES

ARCHIVES DIVISION

State Archives
Iolani Palace Grounds
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813

I, JOLYN G. TAMURA, Archivist of the State Archives, of the State of Hawaii, do hereby certify that the attached document is a true and exact xerographic copy of House Bill No. 2810, no date, "Relating to Discrimination," from the records of the Sixteenth State Legislature,

on file in the STATE ARCHIVES, at Honolulu, State of Hawaii.

WITNESS my hand and seal this 28th day of December, A.D., 1993, at Honolulu, State of Hawaii.

JOIOTH G. TAMUER, STATE ARCHIVIST

A BILL FOR AN ACT

RELATING TO DISCRIMINATION.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF HAWAII:

- 1 SECTION 1. Section 378-1, Hawaii Revised Statutes, is 2 amended by adding a new definition to be appropriately inserted 3 and to read as follows:
- 4 ""Association" means having a marriage, family, or household
 5 relationship with an individual who is protected by this part, or
 6 being a member of an organization identified with or seeking to
 7 promote the interests of individuals who are protected by this
 8 part."
- 9 SECTION 2. Section 489-2, Hawaii Revised Statutes, is 10 amended by adding a new definition to be appropriately inserted 11 and to read as follows:
- "Association" means having a marriage, family, or household

 13 relationship with an individual who is protected by this chapter,

 14 or being a member of an organization identified with or seeking

 15 to promote the interests of individuals who are protected by this

 16 chapter."
- 17 SECTION 3. Section 515-2, Hawaii Revised Statutes, is 18 amended by adding a new definition to be appropriately inserted 19 and to read as follows:

1	" "As	socia	tion" means having a marriage, family, or household
2	relations	hip w	ith an individual who is protected by this chapter,
3	or being	a mem	ber of an organization identified with or seeking
4	to promote	e the	interests of individuals who are protected by this
5	chapter."		
6	SECT	ION 4	. Section 378-2, Hawaii Revised Statutes, is
7	amended to	o read	d as follows:
8	"\$37	8-2 1	Discriminatory practices made unlawful; offenses
9	defined.	It sl	hall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
10	(1)	Becan	use of race, sex, sexual orientation, age,
11		reli	gion, color, ancestry, handicapped status, marital
12		stati	us, [or] arrest and court record[:], or
13		2350	ciation;
14		(A)	For any employer to refuse to hire or employ or to
15	•		bar or discharge from employment, or otherwise to
16			discriminate against any individual in
17			compensation or in the terms, conditions, or
18			privileges of employment;
19		(B)	For any employment agency to fail or refuse to
20			refer for employment, or to classify or otherwise
21			to discriminate against, any individual;
22		(C)	For any employer or employment agency to print,
23			circulate, or cause to be printed or circulated

		any statement, advertisement, or publication or to
2		use any form of application for employment or to
3		make any inquiry in connection with prospective
4		employment, which expresses, directly or
5		indirectly, any limitation, specification, or
6		discrimination;
7	·	(D) For any labor organization to exclude or expel
8		from its membership any individual or to
9		discriminate in any way against any of its
l o		members, employer, or employees; or
u		(E) For any employer or labor organization to refuse
12		to enter into an apprenticeship agreement as
13		defined in section 372-2; provided that no
14		apprentice shall be less than sixteen years of
15		age;
16	(2)	For any employer, labor organization, or employment
17		agency to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate
.8		against any individual because the individual has
.9		opposed any practice forbidden by this part or has
20		filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any
1		proceeding respecting the discriminatory practices
2		prohibited under this part;
3	(3)	For any person whether an employer, employee, or not

1		to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of
2		any of the discriminatory practices forbidden by this
3		part, or to attempt to do so;
4	(4)	For any employer to violate the provisions of section
5		121-43 relating to nonforfeiture for absence by members
6		of the national guard; or
7	(5)	For any employer to refuse to hire or employ or to bar
8		or discharge from employment, any individual because of
9		assignment of income for the purpose of satisfying the
10		individual's child support obligations as provided for
11		under section 571-52."
		HENNIKA NI ZEM 6.000 (2.500 jili) (2.100 jili) (2.500 jili) (2.500 jili) (2.500 jili) (2.500 jili) (2.500 jili)

12 SECTION 5. Section 489-3, Hawaii Revised Statutes, is 13 amended to read as follows:

"\$489-3 Discriminatory practices prohibition. Unfair
15 discriminatory practices which deny, or attempt to deny, a person
16 the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
17 privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public
18 accommodation on the basis of race, sex, color, religion,
19 ancestry, marital status, [or] handicapped status, or association
20 are prohibited."

21 SECTION 6. Section 515-3, Hawaii Revised Statutes, is 22 amended to read as follows:

23 "\$515-3 Discriminatory practices. It is a discriminatory

a

- 12 (3) To refuse to receive or to fail to transmit a bona fide 13 offer to engage in a real estate transaction from a 14 person;
- 15 (4) To refuse to negotiate for a real estate transaction with a person;
- 17 (5) To represent to a person that real property is not

 18 available for inspection, sale, rental, or lease when

 19 in fact it is so available, or to fail to bring a

 20 property listing to the person's attention, or to

 21 refuse to permit the person to inspect real property;
- 22 (6) To print, circulate, post, or mail, or cause to be so 23 published a statement, advertisement, or sign, or to

•	nandle grasped by the person;
2	"Reasonable restriction" shall not include any
3	restriction that allows any owner or person to refuse
4	to negotiate or refuse to engage in the real estate
5	transaction; as used in this chapter, the
6	"reasonableness" of the restriction shall be examined
7	by giving due consideration to the needs of a
8	reasonable prudent person in the same or similar
9	circumstances. Depending on the circumstances, a
10	"reasonable restriction" may require the owner of the
11	service, guide, or signal dog to comply with one or
12	more of the following:
13	(A) Provide proof that the animal is a service dog,
14	guide dog, or signal dog;
រេ	(B) Observe applicable laws including leash laws and
16	pick-up laws;
17	(C) Assume responsibility for damage caused by the
18	dog; or
19	(D) Have the housing unit cleaned upon vacating, by
20	fumigation, deodorizing, professional carpet
21	cleaning, or other method appropriate under the
22	circumstances.
23	The foregoing list is illustrative only, and neither

1		exhaustive nor mandatory;
2		"Service dog" means any dog individually trained and
3		certified by a nationally recognized service dog
4		organization to assist a person with a disability in
5		performing essential activities of daily living;
6		"Signal dog" means any dog individually trained and
7		certified by a nationally recognized signal dog
8		organization to alert a deaf person to intruders or
9		sounds; or
10	(9)	To solicit or require as a condition of engaging in a
11		real estate transaction that the buyer, renter, or
12		lessee be tested for human immunodeficiency virus
13		infection (HIV), the causative agent of acquired
14		immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS)."
15	SECTI	ON 7. Statutory material to be repealed is bracketed.
16 New s	statut	ory material is underscored.
17	SECTI	ON 8. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
18		
19		INTRODUCED BY: Train Him



ROBERT P. TAKUSHI

LLOYD I, UNEBASAMI

STATE OF HAWAII DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING AND GENERAL SERVICES

ARCHIVES DIVISION

State Archives
Iolani Palace Grounds
Honolulu, Hawaii 96813

I, JOLYN G. TAMURA, Archivist of the State Archives, of the State of Hawaii, do hereby certify that the attached document is a true and exact xerographic copy of Testimony dated February 18, 1992, relating to House Bill No. 2810, presented at a joint hearing of the House Committees on Consumer Protection and Commerce and Judiciary on February 18, 1992, by Amefil Agbayani, Chairperson, Hawaii Civil Rights Commission, from the records of the Sixteenth State Legislature,

on file in the STATE ARCHIVES, at Honolulu, State of Hawaii.

WITNESS my hand and seal this 28th day of December, A.D., 1993, at Honolulu, State of Hawaii.

JOGIN G. TAMUJIA, STATE ARCHIVIST

EXHIBIT ____

HAWAI'I CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION

888 MILILANI STREET, 2ND FLOOR · HONOLULU, HI 96813 MHONE (VOICE/TDD): 586-8636 · FAX: 586-8655

February 18, 1992

To:

The Honorable Mazie Hirono, Chairperson, and Members of

the House Committee on Consumer Protection

The Honorable Wayne Metcalf, Chairman, and Members

of the House Committee on Judiciary

From:

Amefil Agbayani, Chairperson and Members of the Hawaii

Civil Rights Commission

Re: H.B. 2810

The Hawaii Civil Rights Commission was created for the purpose of establishing a uniform procedure for the enforcement of the State's discrimination laws in employment, real estate transactions, public accommodations, and access to state and state-funded services.

The Commission supports passage of H.B. 2810 which will protect an individual's associational rights against discrimination in employment, real estate transactions, and public accommodations. Associational discrimination is an indirect form of invidious discrimination. An individual who is a victim of associational discrimination may not be a member of a protected group, but she or he can be discriminated against because of their association with someone who is a member of a protected group.

A person's marriage, family, or household relationships or membership in an organization which promotes the interests of persons who are protected by our civil rights laws should not be a factor in determining their employment status, ability to engage in a real estate transaction, or access to a public accommodation. Without associational protections, our laws against discrimination are incomplete. We need this protection for all of our citizens.

Federal civil rights laws have recognized the need to protect associational rights. In the Americans with Disabilities Act, the associational rights of persons who have disabled family members are protected from discrimination. The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 goes further. It protects the associational rights of persons who have aided or encouraged any person in the exercise or enjoyment of any right under the law. This would include discrimination against persons who oppose housing discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex, disability, familial status, or national origin.

There have been allegations that prohibiting associational discrimination will have the effect of recognizing so-called gay marriages. Such allegations have no basis in reality. They are being made to frighten the members of this committee from voting for this bill in order to allow this form of indirect discrimination to continue.

This bill will also extend the protections against marital status discrimination to public accommodations. Our other civil rights laws in employment and real estate transactions prohibit marital status discrimination, and the public accommodations law should be made consistent. The Commission urges passage of H.B. 2810.